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ReviewThe Evolutionary Origins of MoodDaniel Nettle and Melissa Bateson
The term ‘mood’ in its scientific usage refers to relatively
enduring affective states that arise when negative or posi-
tive experience in one context or time period alters the
individual’s threshold for responding to potentially nega-
tive or positive events in subsequent contexts or time
periods. The capacity for mood appears to be phylogenet-
ically widespread and the mechanisms underlying it are
highly conserved in diverse animals, suggesting it has an
important adaptive function. In this review, we discuss
how moods can be classified across species, and what
the selective advantages of the capacity for mood are.
Core moods can be localised within a two-dimensional
continuous space, where one axis represents sensitivity
to punishment or threat, and the other, sensitivity to
reward. Depressed mood and anxious mood represent
two different quadrants of this space. The adaptive func-
tion of mood is to integrate information about the recent
state of the environment and current physical condition
of the organism to fine-tune its decisions about the alloca-
tion of behavioural effort. Many empirical observations
from both humans and non-human animals are consistent
with this model. We discuss the implications of this adap-
tive approach to mood systems for mood disorders in
humans.Introduction
The word ‘mood’ is most often used in biology with the word
‘disorders’ immediately following it. This is not surprising,
as conditions in which mood is a primary component are
a huge source of suffering in humans. The World Health
Organization’s 2004 Global Burden of Disease report [1]
estimates that the mood disorder depression is currently
the world’s third largest source of morbidity. In middle-
and higher-income countries, and amongst women every-
where, it is the largest single source, by some margin. The
research literature onmood understandably reflects medical
priorities, with a greater emphasis being placed on clinical
problems of mood than on the ‘normal’ psychology of how
mood systems work, and, to the extent to which ‘normal’
mood is studied, a greater emphasis on questions of
proximate mechanism (how is mood controlled in the brain,
or the endocrine system?) than on those of adaptive
function (what is the survival value of having a mood system,
and how does the mood system regulate the individual’s
behaviour in its natural environment?). As behavioural ecol-
ogists, it is these questions of adaptive function that we are
drawn to asking. We also believe that taking such an adap-
tive perspective may provide some insights which are of use
to researchers with more mechanistic and therapeutic
goals. In this review, then, we sketch an account of whatCentre for Behaviour & Evolution and Institute of Neuroscience,
Newcastle University, Henry Wellcome Building, Framlington Place,
Newcastle NE2 4HH, UK.
E-mail: daniel.nettle@ncl.ac.uk (D.N.), melissa.bateson@ncl.ac.uk (M.B.)moods are, how they should be classified, and what the
adaptive function of mood systems may be. The framework
provides us with a clear definition of mood that can be
applied across taxa, and we show that much of what we
know empirically about mood phenomena both in humans
and other species fits naturally into it. We also briefly
discuss what light the adaptive perspective on mood
systems sheds on the origins and distribution of mood
disorders in humans.
The framework presented here integrates ideas from
a number of sources, notably work on emotions as the
activity of survival circuits related to reward and punishment
[2–4], the dimensional classification of emotions [5–8], signal
detection approaches to emotions [9–11], and the human
and animal cognitive bias literatures [8,12,13]. It suggests
potential relevance to mood phenomena of ideas from be-
havioural ecology concerning the adaptive tracking of
changing environments [14–16], and the sensitivity of adap-
tive decisions to the individual’s current physical condition
[17]. These may be promising areas for future work.Emotions: The Signal Detection Approach
Mood belongs to the class of affective, or emotion-related,
phenomena. Emotions are suites of cognitive, motivational
and physiological changes that are triggered by appraisal
of specific classes of environmental situations [4,18]. Fear,
for example, is a suite of responses including increased
vigilance, attentional bias to potential sources of danger,
and physiological preparation for fight or flight that is acti-
vated by the appraisal that there is danger in the environ-
ment. The neural and hormonal mechanisms underlying
core emotions such as fear appear to be highly conserved
across a wide variety of organisms, certainly all vertebrates,
and there are important homologues of these mechanisms
in invertebrates too [4]. This suggests both ancient origins,
and ubiquitous selection maintaining the key features of
emotions as organized systems. In humans, emotions are
also characterized by a subjective valence. That is, they
are experienced as inherently pleasant or unpleasant. This
subjective component has been a focus for emotion theo-
rists in human psychology (for example, [19–21]), but clearly
cannot be invoked in any definition of emotion applicable
across taxa, as we have no direct access to what, if anything,
non-human animals subjectively feel [4,22].
There is a long tradition of explaining the design features
of emotions from an adaptive point of view; they allocate
and marshall the individual’s cognitive and behavioural
resources towards the most immediately important fitness-
relevant priorities given the current state of the world
[4,23–26]. Viewing emotions in this way implies that the
capacity for negatively-valenced emotions has positive
survival value, and there is evidence consistent with this.
In humans, for example, people who are unusually low in
anxiety-proneness suffer increased long-term mortality risk
compared to their more anxiety-prone peers [27,28]. When
considering emotions from an adaptive perspective, it is
useful to conceptualize them as detectors [9–11,29]. That
is, they are mechanisms whose function is to identify when
some input situation X applies in the world, and deliver the
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that is useful for dealing with situations of class X. The
advantage of thinking about emotions as detectors in this
way is that we can draw on a developed body of signal
detection theory [30] to make predictions about how
emotions should work if optimized by natural selection.
Organisms do not apprehend the state of their environ-
ment directly, but instead are constantly receiving cues
that carry some information about it. These cues are pro-
babilistically associated with the presence of important
fitness-relevant situations, but there is generally some
uncertainty about what they imply. For example, a noise
might be caused by a predator approaching, but it might
only be the rustling of leaves; a certain colour might indicate
obtainable food, but it might just be a trick of the light. In
both cases, the fitness-relevant situation produces a signal
whose distribution overlaps to some extent with the dis-
tribution of background noise. The organism thus has to
decide how much information likely to indicate X it has to
receive before mobilizing the appropriate response set Y.
This amount of information is called the detection threshold.
There are four possible outcomes of any detection problem:
a true positive (detects X and does Y when X really does
obtain); a true negative (does not detect X or do Y when X
does not in fact obtain); a false positive (detects X and
does Y even though X does not obtain); or a false negative
(fails to detect X and do Y even though X really does obtain).
If the level of uncertainty is fixed, then in general, lowering
the threshold leads to more true positives, but also more
false positives, and raising it leads to more true negatives,
but also more false negatives.
The optimal detection threshold — that which maximizes
the expected value of the decision — is the product of two
factors: the probability of the event X, and the relative costs
of the four different outcomes [9,31]. If X is very likely under
current conditions, then a low threshold should be set; and
if X is very unlikely under current conditions, then a high
threshold should be set. If a false negative is very costly
relative to a false positive, then all else being equal a low
threshold should be set, even though it leads to many false
positives. Emotions show evidence of these design princi-
ples. In particular, negative emotions such as fear and
anxiety exhibit the ‘smoke detector principle’ [11,32]. That
is, because the cost of the false negative might be death
whilst that of the false positive is just a few calories, the
threshold is set in such a way as to produce many false
positives, but very few false negatives. Having discussed
emotions in general and the way they can be analysed as
signal detectors, we now turn to mood more specifically.
What Is Mood?
Moods are differentiated from acute emotional states in that
they are longer lasting, and are detached from any imme-
diate triggering stimulus [33]. This does not mean that the
state of an individual’s mood is unrelated to its environment.
Rather, mood state appears to be an integrative function of
the organism’s acute emotional experiences over time
[8,34]. An animal repeatedly experiencing specific threats
will gradually develop a more anxious baseline to which it
returns even when no threat is present, and a repeatedly
rewarded animal will develop a more positive mood state
that persists between individual rewards. This temporal
‘spillover’ of emotional state beyond an individual event or
context is a necessary condition for the concept of moodto be invoked. A person who experiences a severe fright or
a sad loss is experiencing an acute emotional response. It
is when this fright or loss spills over into future activities
and contexts that we describe it as an anxious or low
mood, and mood disorder is invoked when this spillover
becomes very prolonged and severe. Thus, the central
question of our review concerns the adaptive function of
having the capacity for mood over and above the capacity
for acute emotion: why would it be advantageous to carry
over emotional state from one time or situation to the next?
Before we address this question directly, we must first
review the ways in which moods can be classified.
A number of different proposals have been made regard-
ing the best classificatory framework for understanding
emotional phenomena, including mood. Here, we adopt
a framework based on two orthogonal continuous dimen-
sions, one relating to readiness to respond to potential
reward, and one relating to readiness to respond to potential
punishment (Figure 1). Mood states can be classified by
their coordinates in the two-dimensional space. Although
this may not capture all of the ways mood states can vary,
particularly in humans, it does capture the principal axes of
variation. This framework, in slightly different versions, has
a venerable history [2,3,5–8], and has several advantages.
First, it is applicable in principle to any organism, regard-
less of its cognitive complexity or ability (if any) to report
subjective feelings. Even bacteria approach rewards and
withdraw from punishers [35], and in invertebrate animals,
the mechanisms regulating such behaviours are recognis-
ably homologous to those in vertebrates (see [4]). This
generality does not mean the framework does not apply
well to humans. In fact, there is considerable evidence
that the subjectively experienced structure of emotions in
humans can be mapped onto the same two axes [7,20].
Second, reward and punishment are fundamental constructs
in animal learning theory, and have clear operational defini-
tions. Rewards are stimuli that can be used to increase the
frequency of a behaviour, whilst punishments are stimuli
that can be used to decrease the frequency of a behaviour.
Third, responses to reward and to punishment are subserved
by somewhat distinct mechanisms in vertebrates, and so
the framework maps on to the underlying neurobiology
[36,37]. Fourth, the framework provides a natural link to
adaptive questions, since rewards and punishments relate
to fitness [3]. Primary rewards tend to be things whose
capture covaries positively with fitness over evolutionary
time, such as food and mates. Primary punishers tend to
be things whose experience covaries negatively with fitness,
such as tissue damage, toxins, isolation, and so forth. Thus,
natural selection will favour mechanisms that lead, over the
set of environments that animals encounter over evolu-
tionary time, to strategies that maximize the capture of
reward whilst minimising the exposure to punishment.
Every point in the two-dimensional space of Figure 1
represents a possible mood state. But what exactly do the
coordinates represent? Here we can employ the signal
detection framework discussed in the previous section.
The position on the horizontal axis gives the individual’s
current threshold for responding to cues of reward. The
further to the right one goes, the lower the threshold. Thus,
individuals toward the right-hand end will readily initiate
reward-approach behaviour when given only minimal cues
that a reward may be available. In humans, these states are
associated with subjective feelings of optimism [38], with
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Figure 1. Biaxial framework for classifying
moods across species.
(A) The axes represent the individual’s detec-
tion thresholds for responding to potential
rewards and punishments, respectively. (B)
Subjective valence of human moods on the
same axes. (C) Locations of some disorders
of mood in humans on the same axes.
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R714attentional biases towards, or salience of, reward-related
stimuli [39,40], and with willingness to try out novel reward-
oriented strategies [41,42]. The left-hand end of the hori-
zontal axis represents a high threshold for the initiation of
reward-approach behaviour (henceforth, we refer to this
end of the horizontal axis as the depressed mood end,
though note no implication of disorder or pathology is in-
tended). In humans, the depressed mood end of the axis is
characterized phenomenologically by the trio of anhedonia,
pessimism and fatigue [43]. These subjective features reflect
the person’s reluctance to initiate reward-approach behav-
iour: they feel that it won’t be pleasurable, that they probably
won’t succeed and that they don’t have the energy to try.
(There are also other features of depressed mood specific
to humans that plausibly reflect adaptive function, but we
do not discuss these here: see [44–46]). In non-human
animals, there is also evidence that repeated reward moves
individuals towards a state of high expectation of reward,whilst repeated non-reward moves
them to a state of low expectation of
reward [8].
The vertical axis of Figure 1 re-
presents the individual’s current
threshold for responding to cues of
potential punishment. At the bottom
end of the axis (the anxious mood
end), this threshold is low. This
means that the individual readily in-
terrupts other activities to focus
on potential dangers. Concomitant
with this are vigilance, sleeplessness,
hyperarousal, and attentional biases
towards threat cues [47–50]. The top
end of the axis represents a relaxed
state where the threshold for mounting
a punishment-oriented response is
high, and the hallmark features of the
bottom end are absent.
Note that the two axes of Figure 1
represent two independent thresh-
olds. At any particular moment an indi-
vidual could have a high threshold for
reward-approach and a low threshold
for punishment-avoidance, in which
case they will be both depressed and
anxiety-prone, but they could also
have a low threshold for reward-
approach and a low threshold for
punishment avoidance (anxiety-prone
but not depressed), or a high thresh-
old for reward-approach and a high
threshold for punishment-avoidance
(depressed but not anxiety-prone).Thus, the axes are genuinely orthogonal, although for the
human case, the overall subjective valence of the mood is
captured by the line y = x, with unpleasant moods towards
the bottom left, and pleasant ones towards the top right.
Why Should Animals Have Mood States?
Having defined and classified moods, we are now in a posi-
tion to return to our core question of why organisms have
evolved the capacity for mood. To recall, mood integrates
acute emotional experiences, such that an individual who
experiences a punishment sets a lower threshold for the
detection of punishments in the next period of time, and an
individual experiencing reward sets a lower threshold for
the detection of reward in the next period of time. Thismeans
that a run of many non-rewards will lead to depressed mood
(move the individual to the left of Figure 1), andmany punish-
ments will lead to anxious mood (move the individual down-
wards on Figure 1). Why would it be adaptive to adjust
Special Issue
R715thresholds in this way? When posing such evolutionary
questions, it is worth considering what the alternative might
be. In this case, the alternative would be an emotional
system where there are fixed thresholds for reward-detec-
tion and for punishment-detection, and the individual returns
to these at the end of each bout of experience, regardless of
what happened during that bout. We will call this a fixed-
emotion architecture, to be contrasted with the mood archi-
tecture animals actually possess.
As discussed above, the optimal threshold for a detector
depends on two factors: the probability of the event to be
detected, and the relative payoffs to the four possible
outcomes of detection. Let us take the probability of the
event first. Environments are so variable in space and time
that evolution cannot build-in detailed information about
the probabilities of particular events. Instead, individuals
use their life experience to derive estimates of these quanti-
ties in the context into which they happen to be operating.
The world is generally an autocorrelated place: if a certain
food typewas too difficult forme to capture today, then other
things being equal, it would be appropriate to infer that this
will also be the case tomorrow. If the environment above
ground was full of hostile predators today, then it is likely,
given that predators are continuous in space and time, that
this will also be the case tomorrow. Thus, given that the envi-
ronment of tomorrow is usually statistically predicted by the
environment of today, it makes sense that the architecture of
emotion should exploit this information rather than throwing
it away. That is, a negative experience should provoke an
acute response, but also an adjustment of expectations
about future experiences. One advantage of a mood system
over a fixed-emotion architecture is that it does exactly this.
A second source of continuity between successive bouts
of behaviour is that it is the same individual performing
them. This is important, because the payoffs of the four
different outcomes of signal detection should not be thought
of as absolute, but rather dependent on the physical condi-
tion of the individual doing the detecting. The cost of a false
negative in the domain of predation is higher for an individual
who is lame than one who is sound. The cost of a false posi-
tive in the domain of foraging may be lower for an individual
with abundant energy reserves than for an individual who has
little spare energy [51,52]. In behavioural ecology, such
examples would be captured by modelling adaptive strate-
gies as a function of ‘state’, where ‘state’ encompasses
current attributes of the individual such as lameness or
energy reserves [17]. Here, we continue to refer to such attri-
butes as physical condition, to avoid confusion with
emotional states. Physical condition is another source of
autocorrelation, as an individual who is lame today will
tend to be lame tomorrow, and an individual who is poorly
nourished today will tend to be poorly nourished tomorrow.
An optimal emotional architecture needs to capture such
persistence of physical condition across bouts of behaviour,
and a fixed-emotion architecture where thresholds are
always fixed fails to do so.
Not only are there two sources of autocorrelation affecting
animals’ optimal signal detection thresholds — the spatio-
temporal autocorrelation of the environment, and the persis-
tence of the individual’s physical condition — but there is
also an interaction between the state of the environment
and the physical condition of the individual. A world contain-
ing few rewards today not only predicts a world with few
rewards tomorrow, but also leaves the individual in worsecondition to cope without reward tomorrow. A day of many
attacks by predators not only increases the individual’s
best estimate of predator prevalence tomorrow, but also
leaves the individual with less energy for coping with attacks
tomorrow. Through such ‘double effects’, optimal detection
thresholds in the current bout of behaviour can be quite
strongly affected by experience in the previous bout (see
Box 1 for a very simple illustrative model). Mood systems
deliver the ongoing adjustments in thresholds for detecting
rewards and punishment required for adaptive behaviour
in such situations, whereas fixed emotion architectures
would not.
To summarise, having a mood system, which adjusts
thresholds for responding to cues of reward and punish-
ment in the light of each emotional experience, rather than
an architecture where those thresholds are fixed, is advan-
tageous where there is autocorrelated variation in the
prevalence of events in the environment, and/or in the indi-
vidual’s physical condition. The higher these autocorrela-
tions are, the more detection thresholds should show
temporal persistence. The adaptive benefit of the capacity
for dynamically changing but persistent moodwill be highest
where the degrees of autocorrelation of environment and
physical condition are intermediate. If they are close to
zero, then there should be no persistence of thresholds
from one time period to the next, whilst if they are close
to one, then individuals can set lifelong thresholds and
there should be no need for mood to update in the light of
recent experience. These ideas link the study of mood to a
mature theoretical literature on how animals should opti-
mally track changing environments more generally (for
example, [14–16]).
Adaptive Interpretation of Mood Phenomena
To what extent does the adaptive framework described in
the previous section capture empirically observed mood
phenomena? It predicts that recent experience of non-
reward should raise the threshold for initiation of reward-
orientation behaviour, which will manifest as depressed
mood. On the other hand, repeated punishment should
make individuals more and more ready to initiate punish-
ment-avoidance behaviour, manifest as anxiety. The human
evidence on the distinct life-event triggers of depression
and anxiety — typically loss or humiliation versus danger,
respectively — are consistent with these predictions [53].
Rewarding life events such as marriage and re-employment
also have the predicted antidepressant effect on mood
[54]. In non-human animals too, changing the distribution
of rewards and punishments in the environment alters
response thresholds as predicted [8].
The framework also predicts that any changes in an indi-
vidual’s physical condition that influence the relative payoffs
of the four possible outcomes of detection are likely to
alter thresholds, and hence mood. Physical infirmity or limi-
tation will usually mean that individuals are less able to
cope with undetected threats if they should arise, and may
be less able to risk the energy of trying and failing at reward
capture. Thus, we should predict that physical infirmity or
limitation will be associated with both anxious mood and
depressed mood. In humans, there is considerable epide-
miological evidence that this is indeed the case [9,55]. Other
circumstances that deplete an individual’s condition, such
as poverty and social isolation in humans, should be ex-
pected to be depressogenic and anxiogenic for similar
Box 1
An illustrative model of mood effects.
How much information should a detector whose function is to detect a dangerous situation of class X require before outputting that X has
occurred? Signal detection theory gives the optimal threshold as:
l>
ð12pÞ
p
,
ðwTN +wFPÞ
ðwTP +wFNÞ (1)
Here, l is the likelihood ratio of the currently received information being generated when X does obtain compared to when it does not, p is the
probability for the current environment that X does obtain, and the ws are the long-term expected fitness payoffs of the four possible
outcomes of detection, the true positive (TP), the true negative (TN), the false positive (FP), and the false negative (FN). From (1), we see that as
X becomesmore prevalent in the environment (p is higher), the optimal threshold gets lower, and if the false negative is very costly compared
to the false positive, the threshold should also be low (the ‘smoke detector principle’ [11,32]).
If the environment was dangerous today, how does this affect the optimal threshold for detecting threats tomorrow? Assume a world where
the prevalence of threats has a long-term mean m, and today’s threat level, pt, is partly predicted by the prevalence of threats yesterday pt-1.
We can thus write the expected deviation of pt from m as b(pt-1 – m), where b is the temporal autoregression coefficient of the environment.
Also, it could be the case that more threats yesterday, by depleting an individual’s physical condition, makes undetected threats today more
difficult to copewith, whilst few threats yesterday leads to an improvement in physical conditionmeaning undetected threats today are easier
to cope with. We capture this by changing wFN for today by an amount proportional to yesterday’s threat prevalence (d(pt–1 – m), where d is
a scaling factor). The optimal threshold for detecting a threat today is thus:
lt >
ð12m2bðpt2 12mÞÞ
ðm+bðpt2 12mÞÞ
,
ðwTN +wFPÞ
ðwTP + ð1+ dðpt2 12mÞÞwFNÞ (2)
Under these assumptions, then, events yesterday affect the optimal threat-detection threshold for today in two ways: via the autoregression
coefficient of the environment (themore autocorrelated the environment, themore a bad yesterday should lower the optimal threat-detection
threshold for today, and a good yesterday raise it) but also by the degree to which events yesterday affect the individual’s capacity to cope
with undetected threats today (the stronger the spillover effect d, the more a bad yesterday should lower the optimal threshold today, and
a good yesterday raise it). We can see how these forces interact by plotting the optimal threat-detection threshold for today against the
prevalence of threats in the environment yesterday for representative values of the parameters of the model (Figure 2). Very similar models
could be constructed for reward-approach rather than threat-avoidance, where positive experiences or an improvement in physical
condition yesterday would affect the optimal threshold for responding to potential cues of reward today.
Current Biology Vol 22 No 17
R716reasons [56–58]. There are analogous non-human examples.
For example, in European starlings, not having access to
bathing water causes individuals to become more sensitive
to potential cues of danger (a conspecific alarm call) [59].
This is presumably because their ability to escape a predator
is compromised by the worse condition of their flight
feathers, meaning that their optimal threshold for threat-
detection is lowered.
Interestingly, when researchers want to create analogous
states to human mood disorders in laboratory rodents, for
example in pharmacological research, they do this either
by increasing the frequency of negative fitness-relevant
events in the animal’s daily experience, as in the social
defeat stress [60,61] and chronic mild stress [62] paradigms,
or else by manipulating the animal’s physical condition in
ways that may make it less able to cope with adversity, as
in the olfactory bulbectomy paradigm [63]. The behavioural
changes produced by these interventions are similar to
symptoms of human mood disorders, and are reversed by
antidepressant medication. Thus, there is at least an implicit
understanding within neurobiological research into mood
disorders that mood is a normal response to changes in
the probability of negative events in the environment, or
changes the animal’s ability to cope with them if they do
occur. However, this understanding is not usually expressed
explicitly in this way.
The framework presented here may be helpful for explain-
ing why depressed mood and anxious mood so often
co-occur. As we have stressed, the reward and punishmentthresholds are logically andmechanistically distinct, so there
is no reason why an individual experiencing anxious mood
should be any more likely to experience depressed mood
than anyone else. In humans, however, depression and
anxiety are very often comorbid, and share many epidemio-
logical predictors [64,65]. A possible reason for this is that,
rather generally, deteriorations in physical condition make
both false-negative threat detections and false-positive
reward-approaches more costly. Thus, anything with a
negative impact on physical condition might be expected
to entrain both anxious and depressed mood simulta-
neously. The current approach might also help account
for the developmental origins of proneness to anxiety and
depression. Adverse developmental conditions, both pre-
and post-birth, have been found to increase the likelihood
of lifetime depression and anxiety in humans [66–69],
and there are analogous findings in non-human animals
[70–73]. It may be that such developmental insults cause
permanent constraints on the individual’s physical condi-
tion that mean that they are less able to deal with threats
and non-rewards as adults. In this case, it would make
adaptive sense that they calibrate their threat-detection
threshold lower, and their reward-approach threshold
higher, accordingly.
‘Cognitive Bias’ as Central to Mood
In the framework described here, the defining features of any
particular mood state within the space illustrated in Figure 1
are the individual’s current thresholds for detecting possible
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Figure 2. The optimal threat-detection
threshold for today as a function of the preva-
lence of threats in the environment yesterday,
for different combinations of model parame-
ters.
(A) Non-autocorrelated environment with no
spillover effect of threatening experiences
yesterday on physical condition today (b =
0 and d = 0). (B) A weakly autocorrelated
environment (b = 0.1) with small spillover
effects of threatening experiences on condi-
tion (d = 0.1). (C) A weakly autocorrelated
environment (b = 0.1) with large spillover
effects of threatening experiences on condi-
tion (d = 1). (D) A strongly autocorrelated
environment (b = 0.5) with small spillover
effects of threatening experiences on condi-
tion (d = 0.1). (E) A strongly autocorrelated
environment (b = 0.5) with large spillover
effects of threatening experiences on condi-
tion (d = 1). The optimal threshold is ex-
pressed in terms of the likelihood ratio of
current evidence being generated when a
threat is and is not present. Other model
parameters are m = 0.5, wALL = 1, in all cases.
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R717reward and punishment. Thus, it predicts that changing the
mood of a person or animal would change the set of ambig-
uous stimuli judged to fall into the classes of ‘threat’ and
‘reward’. Empirical evidence supports this prediction. In hu-
mans, depressed and anxious individuals are more likely to
interpret an ambiguous stimulus in accordancewith its nega-
tive possible meaning than non-depressed non-anxious
controls are [13,74]. This phenomenon came to be termed
cognitive bias, which is in many ways unfortunate now that
it has been documented in so many taxa (see below). The
cognitive is unfortunate because such effects minimally
involve the adjustment of a detection threshold, and thus
do not necessarily require complex cognitive abilities. The
bias is unfortunate because it implies that the phenomena
involve some kind of distortion or erroneous representation
of reality. In fact, in the paradigmatic tasks used to probe
the phenomenon, there is no objectively correct answer,
and hence there is no possibility of error. Thus, the phenom-
enon would be better described as condition-dependent
adjustment of detection thresholds. However, the termi-
nology is now established in the field.
Harding, Paul and Mendl [75] were the first to demonstrate
the cognitive bias phenomenon in a non-human system.
They trained rats to respond to one tone (the food tone) by
pressing a lever to obtain food, and to a different tone (the
noise tone) by not pressing the lever to avoid aversive white
noise. The animals were then assigned to either normal
housing, or unpredictable housing, which is a source of
chronic mild stress. Individuals were then tested with tones
that were intermediate between the training stimuli, and
hence ambiguous. Rats in the unpredictable housing group
were less likely to respond to the original food tone, but
also treated more of the intermediates between the food
and white noise tones as being like the white noise tone
(by not pressing the lever) than the animals from the normal
housing did. This basic effect, whereby the threshold for
treating an ambiguous stimulus as heralding a negative
event is affected by the environment the individual has expe-
rienced, or covaries with other markers of mood, has been
confirmed with different experimental paradigms in rats[76–78], and also been demonstrated inmany other systems,
including sheep [79], dogs [80], pigs [81], rhesus macaques
[82], starlings [83,84], chickens [85] and even honeybees
[86]. The changed thresholds are returned to normal by anti-
depressant treatments in chickens [85,87], just as they are in
humans [88]. This suggests that altered thresholds for de-
tecting rewards and punishment are central to mood across
taxa. As well as validating the signal detection approach, this
raises the possibility of being able to assess mood in a way
that is readily transferable from one species to another,
with important implications for the science of animal
welfare [8,12].
Implications for Mood Disorders
Everything we have discussed so far concerns the normal
functioning of the mood system, which we have argued is
an adaptation for allocating the individual’s behaviour in
ways most appropriate for their current condition and envi-
ronment. We have claimed that the key features of moods,
the anhedonia, pessimism and fatigue in depression, and
the vigilance, threat-bias and physiological response of
anxiety, represent means by which they fulfil their evolved
function. We have also argued that certain epidemiological
patterns of depressed and anxious mood, such as their trig-
gering by losses and dangers, and their relationships with
infirmity, isolation and poverty, make adaptive sense. How
then should we interpret mood disorders, which are after
all the main clinical concern? The very use of the word
disorder implies that something in the system has gone
wrong, and that the set of symptoms is the set of down-
stream consequences of this malfunction. This appears to
be the assumption in work in the neurobiological bases of
mood disorders. Yet it is also widely recognised that depres-
sive and anxious disorders are often triggered by life events
to which depressed and anxious mood would be a normal
(healthy) response.
The proper boundary between a normal mood response
and a pathological one is extremely hard to identify. There
is no statistical point of rarity in the population distribution
of current anxious or depressed symptoms that offers an
Box 2
Open questions in the evolution of mood.
Our analysis in the main text is simple but leaves unaddressed a number of issues likely to be important in understanding mood phenomena
from an evolutionary perspective. We argue that mood involves an integrative function of acute emotional experiences over time. However,
we imply that this function is simple accumulation or averaging. In reality, organisms may be sensitive to the local rate of change in their
environment (or indeed in their physical condition) as well. This makes different predictions from a simple averaging model; for example, that
the mood implications of two poor outcomes followed by a good one would be different from those of a good outcome followed by two poor
ones. Such contrast effects have indeed been widely documented in humans and in non-human animals [34,100–102]. They can lead to
apparently irrational preferences, such as people preferring a procedure that involves more pain overall, but an improving pain gradient, to
one with less pain [103]. However, they may arise from decision rules that are generally adaptive in environments that have marked
trajectories of deterioration or improvement. It would be interesting to investigate howmuch of the seasonal variation documented in human
mood [104] arises from the fact that the direction of change of the environment is negative in autumn but positive in spring, even if the
averages are not much different.
Another issue for future investigation is how and why mood generalizes across different domains of life. For example, providing cover in
birds’ housing, whichmight be expected to reduce perception of hazard in the domain of predation, has an effect on the birds’ thresholds for
responding to cues of toxins in their prey [100]. Why this generalization across domains should occur is not immediately clear; although
environments tend to be autocorrelated within a domain, there is no reason to think that the prevalence of toxins in prey is in general
predicted by the prevalence of predators. Thus, it seems that there ought to be separate mood systems for each domain of fitness-relevant
activity, rather than a ‘general’ level of mood. One possible explanation for the generalization of mood across domains is that the individual’s
current physical condition is the determinant of their ability to cope with negative outcomes across all domains. Thus, just as we argued for
the comorbidity of anxious and depressed mood, any change in physical condition should have a pervasive impact (see also [29] on related
issues).
Finally, we have not addressed the origins or function of the subjective experience of mood in humans. By defining mood in terms of
thresholds for responding to reward and punishment, our formulation allows for mood to be phylogenetically widespread without implying
anything about subjective consciousness in non-human animals. However, this does not mean that subjective content is not an important
component of mood in the human case. It is clearly the aspect of mood that matters most to people. Why exactly there should be
phenomenally experienced components of mood and emotion, and how these evolved from mechanisms we share with other vertebrates
is — as the philosophers say — a hard problem, and well beyond the scope of our review. However, this does not mean it cannot be
addressed [105].
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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychi-
atric Association, 4th edition, uses the arbitrary cut-off of
two weeks’ duration of symptoms for diagnosis of depres-
sive disorder, but the extent to which two weeks of
depressedmood is abnormal depends on what is happening
in the individual’s life. Indeed, theManual recognizes that the
two weeks of symptoms that would usually be taken to indi-
cate pathology constitute a normal response in the recently
bereaved. Thus, any purely symptomatic boundary between
normality and disorder is inevitably somewhat arbitrary, and
must recognise a gradation of severity blending into the
range of normal but unhappy.
Evolutionary thinking has been used to propose alternative
criteria for what constitutes disorder as opposed to healthy
function: disorder is present when a biological system is
not producing the effects that led to its evolutionary selec-
tion, and the consequences of this are harmful [90]. This
leaves unanswered the question of how harmful the conse-
quences have to be (and what the metric of harm is), so arbi-
trary boundary decisions are still required. Moreover, it is
very hard—except in extreme cases— to show that a partic-
ular person’smood response is inappropriate to their current
environment and state, as we rarely have exhaustive and
objective enough information about their lives to be able to
determine this. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact
that there is considerable genetic variation affecting the
responsiveness of mood systems [91–94]. Such variation
may have been maintained in part by variable selectionpressures acting on these systems across different environ-
mental conditions [95,96]. A consequence is that some
people are prone to more extreme mood reactions than
others when faced with the same environmental triggers,
even in the absence of any pathology of the system. Given
such polymorphism, it is hard to make much progress on
the question of what level of mood-responsiveness is normal
in an evolutionary sense.
Mood systems are no different from any other biological
mechanism in that they can go wrong sometimes, becoming
hypersensitive or dysregulated. Horwitz and Wakefield [97]
are probably correct to argue that what we currently diag-
nose as disordered mood represents a mixture of cases
where individuals have had adverse life experiences, but
their mood system is itself functioning exactly as it should,
and cases where the neurobiological mechanisms subserv-
ing mood are dysregulated or diseased. There is unlikely to
ever be any simple way of demarcating the boundary
between these two sources ofmoodproblemswith precision
(see [45,98] for further discussion). Note, however, that the
criteria for therapeutic concern and medical intervention do
not need to depend on being able to distinguish evolved
function from dysfunction. In physical pain, for example,
administration of analgesia is almost universal, and it is
implausible that in all cases this is because of malfunction
in people’s pain systems. Rather, we now have technologies
to slightly dampen systems that are in fact fulfilling their
evolved function, and the justification for doing this is based
on suffering, rather than demonstrable dysfunction in the
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unexplored questions about whether pharmacologically
manipulating adaptive systems, though producing imme-
diate relief, might lead to adverse consequences in the long
run. Given the evidence that moderate anxiety is associated
with a slightly reduced risk of death (for example [27]), what
might be the consequence of widespread pharmacological
treatment for moderate anxiety? It is remarkable how little
research hasbeen conductedon suchquestions, anda virtue
of the adaptive perspective is that it naturally raises them.
The evolutionary perspective may not solve issues of
demarcation between normality and illness, but it does
help broaden the debate on how to deal with the burden of
mood disorder. Much current therapeutic focus is on either
techniques to change the cognitive styles entailed by
anxious and depressed mood, or on pharmaceutical tech-
nologies to stabilize the proximate neurobiological mecha-
nisms. We do not dispute the importance of both of these.
However, thinking in behavioural ecological terms naturally
leads us to attend also to how environments might be
changed to reduce the burden of suffering. That is, if human
environments could be made less punishing and more
rewarding for the people who are most at risk (the poor,
the unemployed, the vulnerable, the socially isolated), and
people’s physical condition could be better protected
through their lives (through better nutrition and medical
care), then we would see a reduction in depressed and
anxious mood. This reduction would span those whose
mood systems are hypersensitive and those whose mood
systems have a normal sensitivity, those we currently
consider as having a mood disorder and also the larger
bulk of people who do not meet current diagnostic criteria
but are still unhappy. Thus, the behavioural ecological
perspective helps us see depression and anxiety not just
as problems of the individual brain, but as consequences
of how individuals’ brains interact with the way we structure
societies and environments.
Conclusions
The study of the functions of mood phenomena in different
types of animals is much less advanced than the study of
the proximate mechanisms underlying mood changes.
Although we have sketched an approach here, it is extremely
preliminary, and there are many open questions (Box 2).
However, understanding what mood is for makes sense of
the ways in which environmental conditions, life events,
and developmental history interact to affect individuals’
moods. Developing integrative theoretical frameworks for
the study of mood across taxa provides a bridge between
psychology and behavioural ecology, and will be of benefit
in applications as diverse as psychiatric epidemiology and
the science of animal welfare.
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